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INTRODUCTION
Last Term, in King v. Burwell, the Supreme Court upheld a Treasury
regulation interpreting the Affordable Care Act to allow for tax subsidies in
healthcare exchanges established by the Federal Government.' The statute,
I.R.C. § 36B (Section 36B), grants premium tax credits to certain taxpayers
who are "enrolled in [insurance plans] through an Exchange established by
the State under section 1311."2 To ensure all qualifying taxpayers receive the
tax credits regardless of whether their State has established its own exchange,
the Treasury Department promulgated a regulation interpreting "an Exchange
established by the State" to include any "State Exchange, regional Exchange,
subsidiary Exchange, and Federally-facilitated Exchange."3 The challengers
to the regulation argued that the agency's interpretation was contrary to the
plain text of the statute.
In a 6-3 decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court did not find
the statutory language unambiguous.4 Nor, however, did it accord deference
* Professor of Law and Assistant Professor of Law, respectively, Michael E. Moritz College of
Law, The Ohio State University.
1. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480,2496 (2015).
2. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
3. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377-01, 30,378 (May 23, 2012)
(codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 602) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 155.20) (noting that "[c]ommentators disagreed
on whether the language in section 36B(b)(2)(A) limits the availability of the premium tax credit only
to taxpayers who enroll in qualified health plans on State Exchanges," but concluding that it did not
so limit because the broader interpretation "is consistent with the language, purpose, and structure of
section 36B and the Affordable Care Act as a whole").
4. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492.
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to the agency's interpretation of the statutory ambiguity.' Instead, the Court
interpreted the statute de novo and concluded that "the context and structure
of the Act compel us to depart from what would otherwise be the most natural
reading of the pertinent statutory phrase" to "allow[] tax credits for insurance
purchased on any Exchange created under the Act."' That is because the
premium tax "credits are necessary for the Federal Exchanges to function like
their State Exchange counterparts, and to avoid the type of calamitous result
that Congress plainly meant to avoid."
King v. Burwell is a crucial victory for the Obama Administration and for
the future of the Affordable Care Act. It also has important implications for
tax law and administration, as explored in the other terrific contributions to
this Symposium.8 In this Essay, we turn to another tax-related feature of the
Chief Justice's opinion for the Court: It is hard to ignore the fingerprints of a
tax lawyer throughout the opinion.
This Essay focuses on two instances of a tax lawyer at work. First, in the
Chief's approach to statutory interpretation one sees a tax lawyer as
interpreter. As others have observed, the Chief and the Court more generally
seem to be embracing a brand of contextualism that departs from the
textualism that has predominated during Justice Scalia's tenure on the Court.
The Chief's articulation of this interpretive approach in King, however, tracks
tax law's substance-over-form doctrine. In particular, the Chief looks beyond
Congress's formal, textual characterization of the statutory provision to
recharacterize the provision based on strong proof of its true nature or
substance.9 Indeed, this is not the first time the Chief has taken an approach
similar to the substance-over-form doctrine when interpreting the Affordable
Care Act. He also seemed to do so when rejecting the constitutional challenge
to the statute three Terms prior.10
Second, as to King's sweeping administrative law holding that is the main
subject of this Symposium, the Chief crafts a new major questions doctrine
that could significantly cut back on federal agency lawmaking authority by
5. Id. at 2489.
6. Id. at 2495-96.
7. Id. at 2496.
8. See Ellen Aprill, King v. Burwell and Tax Court Review of Regulations, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 6
(2015); Andy Grewal, King v. Burwell: Where Were the Tax Professors?, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 48
(2015); Kristin Hickman, The (Perhaps) Unintended Consequence of King v. Burwell, 2015 PEPP. L.
REV. 56 (2015); Steve Johnson, The Rise and Fall of Chevron in Tax: From the Early Days to King
and Beyond, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 19 (2015); Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan, King v. Burwell:
What Does It Portend for Chevron's Domain?, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 72 (2015). For an overview of the
Symposium, see David Gamage, Foreword-King v. Burwell Symposium: Comments on the
Commentaries (and on Some Elephants in the Room), 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (2015).
9. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496.
10. See Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,2594 (2012).
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not applying Chevron deference at all to "question[s] of 'deep economic and
political significance.' Yet the Chief seems to develop this doctrine against
the backdrop of tax exceptionalism-the notion that general administrative
law principles do not apply to tax -and thus this development may be limited
to extraordinary circumstances at the intersection of tax and administrative
law.
This Symposium importantly addresses the effect of King v. Burwell on
tax law and administration. As this Essay illustrates, however, it is also worth
exploring the potential effect of tax law on the Chief's opinion. Tax
exceptionalism may well limit the opinion's impact on administrative law,
and tax law may better inform the Chief's (and the Court's) evolution from
textualism to contextualism in statutory interpretation. The growing call to
abandon the perception that tax is exempt from general principles of
administrative law may well be correct. We believe it is. But that does not
mean tax law cannot provide us with special insights that can be applied in
other legal contexts.
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: AN EMBRACE OF TAX LAW'S
SUBSTANCE-OVER-FORM DOCTRINE?
A number of scholars have observed an emerging trend in the Court's
approach to statutory interpretation: some form of purposivism is reemerging
from the Court's predominantly textualist approach. As one of us has noted,
"it appears that contextualism is quickly replacing Justice Scalia's textualism
as the foundation for statutory interpretation." 2 Richard Re has labeled this
novel form of statutory interpretation "The New Holy Trinity," arguing that
the Chief's opinion in King as well as a number of other opinions from the
Court reveal a more purposivist approach where "legal ambiguity can spring
from a mix of text, purpose, and pragmatism."" Others have reached similar
conclusions about this purposivist revival. 4
11. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444
(2014)).
12. Christopher J. Walker, What King v. Burwell Means for Statutory Interpretation, YALE J. ON
REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 25, 2015), http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/what-king-v-burwell-
means-for-statutory-interpretation-by-chris-walker.
13. Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 407, 421 (2015); see id. at 413-15
(discussing King, 135 S. Ct. 2480). Professor Re's formulation invokes the famous case Holy Trinity
Church v. United States, in which the Supreme Court declared that "[i]t is a familiar rule that a thing
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor
within the intention of its makers." 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
14. See, e.g., Michael Dorf, Why Can't Consequences Create Ambiguity?, DORF ON LAW (June 4,
2014), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2014/06/why-cant-consequences-create-ambiguityihtml; Rick
Hasen, King v. Burwell: The Return of "Purpose" in Statutory Interpretation, ELECTION LAW BLOG
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For tax lawyers, the Chief's move in King v. Burwell from text or
formality to context or substance is not an unfamiliar one. The divergence of
written words from the reality of life is an ever-present feature of tax law. By
focusing on the intended effect and actual operation of Section 36B, rather
than its outward trappings, the Chief tapped into a longstanding tradition of
tax jurisprudence: the substance-over-form doctrine."
The substance-over-form doctrine requires courts to "look beyond the
taxpayers' characterization" of a transaction to determine the transaction's
economic effect. The "analysis is inherently factual," and it requires a court
to consider evidence on both the intended purpose and the economic effect of
a taxpayer's actions.17 When the substance of a transaction differs from its
form in a way that provides the taxpayer with an undue benefit, a court may
recharacterize the transaction in accordance with its true nature." A taxpayer,
however, is usually stuck with the characterization that she chooses; she may
deviate only in limited circumstances." In some jurisdictions, a court may
recharacterize a transaction at the taxpayer's request if she produces "strong
proof' to support the new characterization.20 In other jurisdictions, the
taxpayer must produce proof that would be admissible either to support
reformation of the agreement underlying the transaction or to show
unenforceability arising from contract defenses such as mistake,
misrepresentation, or duress.2 1
(June 25, 2015), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=73760; Marty Lederman, Textualism? Purposivism?
The Chief Justice Comes Down on the Side of Interpretive Pragmatism, SLATE (June 25, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/the-breakfasttable/features/2015/scotus-roundup/
supreme_court_2015johnrobertsruling-inkingvyburwell.html.
15. The doctrine first appeared in Gregory v. Helvering, in which the Supreme Court disregarded
the form of a transaction that was "masquerading as a corporate reorganization" when it was something
else entirely. 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935). In disregarding the taxpayer's characterization of the
transaction, the court refused "to exalt artifice above reality." Id. A later court of appeals noted that
the doctrine is "elementary in the law of taxation." Shultz v. Comm'r, 294 F.2d 52, 56 (9th Cir. 1961).
16. True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1174 (10th Cir. 1999) ("This fundamental tax principle"
prefers the "true nature of [the] transaction" over "mere formalisms.").
17. Id. at 1177-78.
18. See Unites States v. Ingalls, 399 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1968) (recharacterizing employer's
purchase of employee's contract as blanket forgiveness of employee's debt to employer).
19. See Shultz, 294 F.2d at 56 ((noting that when taxpayers, rather than the Commissioner, seek to
deviate from formalities of the transaction, courts rely "heavily on the formal means which the parties
used").
20. See Muskat v. United States, 554 F.3d 183, 188 (1st Cir. 2009) (requiring strong proof that
intended allocation of contract price differed from allocation specified by document); Kreider v.
Comm'r, 762 F.2d 580, 586-87 (7th Cir. 1985) (requiring strong proof that payment was additional
consideration for stock "rather than what [the agreement] says it is").
21. See Comm'r v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir. 1967) (holding that "a party can
challenge the tax consequences of his agreement as construed by the Commissioner only by adducing
proof which in an action between the parties to the agreement would be admissible to alter that
construction or to show its unenforceability because of mistake, undue influence, fraud, duress, etc.").
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In King v. Burwell, the Chief has unleashed his inner tax lawyer with a
brand of contextualism that seems to take cues from the substance-over-form
doctrine. Interpreting the statutory language at issue-which, at first blush,
appears to deny a tax credit (or grants a credit of $0) to taxpayers who
purchased insurance on an exchange other than one "established by the
State"-the Court waded into a discussion of purpose, effect, and
congressional intent.2 2 Or, from the perspective of a tax lawyer, the Chief
demonstrated a preference for legislative substance over form.
In contrast to the constitutional challenge to the Affordable Care Act
addressed in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius
(NFIB) ,23 discussed below, where the Federal Government sought the Court's
affirmation of its chosen form, the Government in King v. Burwell called for
the Court to either read into, or essentially disregard, the language of the
statute.24 In tax law, when a party to a transaction seeks to disavow the form
of that transaction, the party must either provide strong proof to support the
alternative characterization, or demonstrate that the agreement underlying the
chosen form would be alterable or voidable under contract law.25
The Chief's opinion in King v. Burwell, albeit unintentionally, provides
support for satisfaction of both the strong proof and the voidable contract
standards applicable to a disavowal of form. It is apparent that the Court's
primary concern was substance. Quoting a prior case, the Chief wrote that
interpreting a section of the Internal Revenue Code in the context of an entire
statutory scheme may bring clarity "because only one of the permissible
meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the
law."2 6 Put differently,
A fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the
legislative plan.
Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health
insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we must
interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the former, and
avoids the latter. Section 36B can fairly be read consistent with what
22. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480,2488 (2015); I.R.C. § 36B(b)-(c) (2012).
23. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
24. As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in King, "Words no longer have meaning if an Exchange
that is not established by a State is 'established by the State."' King, 135 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
25. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
26. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492 (emphasis added) (quoting United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)).
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we see as Congress's plan, and that is the reading we adopt.27
Having chosen to elevate substance over plain meaning, the Chief
reviewed the facts and relied on "strong proof' that the substantive meaning
of the law is something different than the words with which it is recorded.2 8
This proof was not limited to evidence of congressional purpose provided by
a fair reading of the statute as a whole. The Chief also relied on evidence
from the experiences of various states that had implemented laws similar to
the one at issue29 and on reports from multiple experts regarding "the type of
calamitous result that Congress plainly meant to avoid." 0
The Chief's opinion also might support an application of the voidable
contract standard for disavowal of form. Its discussion of the legislative
bargaining process contains many of the elements needed to build a case for
reformation on the basis of mistake or, if one stretches, unconscionability.3 1
The Chief chides Congress for its "inartful drafting" and observes that much
of the process was conducted "behind closed doors" with "limited
opportunities for debate and amendment" and no opportunity for the usual
sixty-vote filibuster.3 2 Taken in the aggregate, these observations highlight
the infirmity of the statutory drafting in juxtaposition to the seeming clarity of
the law's intended effect, just as similar showings in the transactional context
would highlight the infirmity of the claimed form of a transaction that deviates
from its economic substance.
Accordingly, the Chief concludes that although the argument for the
statute's plain meaning is "strong," it is "implausible" that Congress intended
the dramatic result that a plain interpretation would render." In other words,
for our Chief Justice as a tax lawyer in King v. Burwell, it was the effect of
Section 36B -its substance-that mattered more than its textual form.
27. Id. at 2496.
28. See Kreider v. Comm'r, 762 F.2d at 586-87 (requiring "strong proof' of taxpayer's claim that
the substance of a transaction was different from the form claimed by the taxpayer).
29. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2486 (describing the experiences of Massachusetts, New York, and
Washington).
30. Id. at 2496; see id. at 2493 (considering expert opinions).
31. Traditionally, reformation on the basis of mistake occurs "when the parties, having reached an
agreement and having then attempted to reduce it to writing, fail to express it correctly in the writing."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 155 cmt. a. A contract may be reformed or avoided on
the basis of unconscionability when the substantive result is so unfair as to "shock the conscience"
and when the bargaining process suffered from a procedural flaw such as unfairness in negotiation of
the contract, oppression due to unequal bargaining power, or unfair surprise resulting from hidden
terms. See Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Inds., 298 F.3d 778, 783-784 (9th Cir. 2002).
32. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492-93.
33. Compare id. at 2495 ("Petitioners' arguments about the plain meaning of Section 36B are
strong."), with id. at 2494 ("It is implausible that Congress meant the Act to operate in this manner.").
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We would be remiss if we failed to mention that the Chief's focus on
substance in King was not a flash in the pan. The Chief's prior opinion in
NFIB also suggests that the Chief's spirit animal is, indeed, a tax lawyer.
Again interpreting the Affordable Care Act, he wrote that "[t]he most
straightforward reading" of the Act's individual mandate "commands
individuals to purchase insurance," but, substantively, the mandate is a tax on
the failure to do so.3 To reach this conclusion, the Chief focused on the real-
world effect of the law, just as a court would do if it were applying the
substance-over-form doctrine in a transactional context." He observed that
the law "looks like a tax" even though Congress called it a "shared
responsibility payment."" He noted that the required payment is made to the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) by "taxpayers" and that "its amount is
determined by such familiar factors as taxable income, number of dependents,
and joint filing status."3 7 Like any jurist in a tax case confronted by a
mismatch between form and substance, the Chief concluded that the validity
of the individual mandate was "not controlled by Congress's choice of
label.""
Elevating substance over form, the opinions in King and NFIB suggest
that the country's chief jurist would be just as adept on the Tax Court as on
the Supreme Court. More importantly, jurists such as the Chief who seem
interested in replacing textualism with contextualism in statutory
interpretation would be wise to look more closely at tax law, as tax lawyers
have long struggled in the transactional context with the tension between
substance and form.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A NEW MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE OR
TAx EXCEPTIONALISM?
Tax also seems to pervade the Chief's approach to administrative law in
King v. Burwell. That the Government prevailed in King may not have been
too surprising, despite the fact that many court watchers were unsure after
argument which way the Court would rule. The way the Court reached its
decision, however, was surprising - at least to administrative law practitioners
and scholars.3
34. Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012).
35. See id. at 2594.
36. Id. at 2594-95.
37. Id. at 2594.
38. Id. at 2595.
39. This Part builds on and borrows from a post one of us authored the day King v. Burwell was
decided. See Christopher J. Walker, What King v. Burwell Means for Administrative Law, YALE J.
ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 25, 2015), http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/what-king-v-burwell-
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After all, the Court was reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute
that Congress has charged the agency to administer.40 Under the Chevron two-
step approach, the Court defers to an agency's interpretation of a statute it
administers if, at Step One, the court finds "the statute is silent or ambiguous"
and then, at Step Two, determines that the agency's reading is a "permissible
construction of the statute."4 ' This is a generous standard for agencies. The
Court "need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it
permissibly could have adopted . .. or even the reading the court would have
reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding."42
Under Chevron deference, to uphold the regulation in King, one may have
expected the Court to find the statutory provision ambiguous at Step One and
then defer to the agency's interpretation as reasonable at Step Two. Or, if the
Court truly believed the statute was unambiguous in the Government's favor
(or, perhaps the more cynical view, that it wanted to foreclose a subsequent
presidential administration from reinterpreting the statute via regulation to
prohibit tax subsidies in exchanges established by the Federal Government),
the Court could have just ruled that the statute is unambiguous at Chevron
Step One, after applying the traditional tools of statutory interpretation.
Instead, writing for the six-Justice majority, the Chief broke new ground
in administrative law, ruling that Chevron deference does not apply to
questions such as this one that are of "deep economic and political
significance." 43 This new major questions doctrine is crisply articulated in
two paragraphs from the Chief's opinion:
When analyzing an agency's interpretation of a statute, we often
apply the two-step framework announced in Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
Under that framework, we ask whether the statute is ambiguous and,
if so, whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable. Id. at 842-
43. This approach "is premised on the theory that a statute's
ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the
agency to fill in the statutory gaps." FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000). "In extraordinary cases,
means-for-administrative-law-by-chris-walker.
40. See I.R.C. § 36B(g) (2012) (providing that "[t]he Secretary [of the Treasury] shall prescribe
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section").
41. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
42. Id. at 843 n.11.
43. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480,2489 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be sure,
Justice Kennedy perhaps foreshadowed such a conclusion at oral argument when he noted in
discussing Chevron deference that "it seems to me a drastic step for us to say that the Department of
Internal Revenue and its director can make this call one way or the other when there are, what, billions
of dollars of subsidies involved here." Transcript of Oral Argument at 74, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct.
2480 (2015) (No. 14-114).
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however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that
Congress has intended such an implicit delegation." Ibid.
This is one of those cases. The tax credits are among the Act's
key reforms, involving billions of dollars in spending each year and
affecting the price of health insurance for millions of people.
Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a
question of deep "economic and political significance" that is central
to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question
to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly. Util. Air
Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) (quoting
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160). It is especially unlikely that
Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has
no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort. See
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266-267 (2006). This is not a
case for the IRS."
Citing Justice O'Connor's opinion in Brown & Williamson is often a
strong signal that a court is departing from traditional administrative law
principles. And, sure enough, the Chief cites Brown & Williamson
extensively as part of his effort to reassert the judiciary's primary role in
interpreting statutes that raise questions of "deep economic and political
significance." 45 This new major questions doctrine is a major blow to a bright-
line, rule-based approach to Chevron deference. To be sure, the major
questions doctrine-the presumption, as Justice Scalia artfully framed it in
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, that Congress "does not . . . hide
elephants in mouseholes"46 -has been around for a while. But its application
here seems strained and less obvious. A number of other contributions to this
Symposium explore the extraordinary nature of this new doctrine, with one
contributor remarking that this may be the death of Chevron,4 7 another
explaining how this extraordinary case makes bad law,48 and a third mapping
the unintended yet far-reaching consequences of this new administrative law
doctrine.49
Moreover, the Chief's case-by-case approach of looking to the particular
statutory subsection for congressional intent of delegation (at least for major
questions) reads a lot like his dissent in City ofArlington v. FCC.so There, the
44. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89 (internal citations shortened).
45. Id. at 2488-90.
46. 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
47. Johnson, supra note 8.
48. Lederman & Dugan, supra note 8.
49. Hickman, supra note 8.
50. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
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Chief argued that "[a] court should not defer to an agency until the court
decides, on its own, that the agency is entitled to deference."" The City of
Arlington Court, with Justice Scalia writing, rejected this case-by-case
approach in the context of agency jurisdiction questions (which are arguably
another type of major questions). In particular, Justice Scalia dismissed the
Chief's approach that "even when general rulemaking authority is clear, every
agency rule must be subjected to a de novo judicial determination of whether
the particular issue was committed to agency discretion."5 2
One could say that King v. Burwell-while a critical win for the Obama
Administration-is a judicial power grab over the Executive in the modem
administrative state. Some may say this judicial intervention is long overdue
in light of the staggering amount of lawmaking authority Congress has
delegated to federal agencies." In calling for closer judicial scrutiny of
agency statutory interpretations in City ofArlington, the Chief's dissent noted
that, "with hundreds of federal agencies poking into every nook and cranny
of daily life, [the ordinary] citizen might ... understandably question whether
Presidential oversight-a critical part of the Constitutional plan-is always
an effective safeguard against agency overreaching."5 4 It will be interesting
to see whether this new major questions doctrine is a one-off holding made
under extraordinary circumstances, or whether there will be further cutting
back on the scope of federal agency lawmaking authority. A number of the
other contributors to this Symposium seem firmly in the camp of King v.
Burwell constituting a sea change in administrative law."
We are not so sure-at least not yet. There are hints in the opinion of the
Chief channeling a tax lawyer, suffering from "tax myopia"" and thus crafting
an opinion that may well be good only for tax. As we have explored
elsewhere, this tax exceptionalism-the perception that tax is so different
from the rest of the regulatory state that general administrative law principles
do not apply-has long plagued tax law.57 To be sure, the Supreme Court, the
51. Id. at 1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 1874.
53. See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REv. 999,
1000-02 (2015) (documenting debate and rise of agency lawmaking).
54. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1879 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).
55. See Hickman, supra note 8, at 70; Johnson, supra note 8, at 31-32; Lederman & Dugan, supra
note 8, at 80-81.
56. See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax Lawyers,
13 VA. TAX REv. 517,518-19 (1994) (arguing that "tax law too often is mistakenly viewed by lawyers,
judges, and law professors as a self-contained body of law" and that "this misperception has impaired
the development of tax law by shielding it from other areas of law that should inform the tax debate").
57. See Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism, 99
MINN. L. REv 221 (2014); see also Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax
Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1541 (2006) (describing the
42
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D.C. Circuit, and most recently the Tax Court have all signaled the demise of
tax exceptionalism, calling for tax law to be bound by the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) and general principles of administrative law. But tax
exceptionalism persists. The Chief's opinion, for instance, shows some
symptoms. This could signal that, in developing a new major questions
doctrine, the Chief intended to "carve out an approach to administrative
review good for tax law only" - something that would be quite ironic
considering that the Chief also authored the Mayo decision that rejected tax
exceptionalism in the Chevron deference context.59
The strongest evidence of such tax exceptionalism lies in the Chief's
reasoning for not according any deference to the agency's interpretation. The
Chief concluded that Congress did not delegate this interpretive question
because it involved "billions of dollars in spending each year and affect[ed]
the price of health insurance for millions of people" -deep economic and
political questions.60 But he also found it "especially unlikely that Congress
would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in
crafting health insurance policy of this sort."" In other words, it is the
exceptional nature of the IRS in this context (in particular, its lack of
expertise) that suggests the lack of congressional delegation.
Andy Grewal, another contributor to this Symposium, has argued
elsewhere that the Chief misunderstood the expertise at issue:
The IRS doesn't purport to be a master of health care reform,
renewable energy, or international economic policy. Rather, the
IRS's expertise relates to understanding how complex tax code
provisions bear on those things. This is a much more modest task
and involves exploring different interpretations within statutorily
"perception of tax exceptionalism that intrudes upon much contemporary tax scholarship and
jurisprudence").
58. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44,56 (2011) (finding
"no reason why ... review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to
Chevron to the same extent as .. .review of other regulations"); Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717,
723, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding that the judicial review provisions of the APA apply with
full force to an IRS notice because "[t]he IRS is not special in this regard; no exception exists shielding
it-unlike the rest of the Federal Government-from suit under the APA"); Altera Corp. &
Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 145 T.C. No. 3, at *28 (July 27, 2015) (invalidating income tax regulations
because they were not the product of "reasoned decisionmaking" as required by the APA and related
administrative law precedent).
59. Cf. Mayo, 562 U.S. 44 at 55 (refusing "to carve out an approach to administrative review good
for tax law only").
60. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
61. Id.
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defined parameters.62
Similarly, as Leandra Lederman and Joseph Dugan explore more fully in their
contribution to the Symposium, neither the Treasury nor the IRS actually
developed this definition of "exchange"; instead, the Treasury regulation at
issue incorporated the definition already promulgated by the Department of
Health and Human Services -a federal agency with even more expertise in
this subject matter.6 3
Moreover, Kristin Hickman, also a contributor to this Symposium, has
explored empirically how the IRS engages in a substantial amount of nontax
regulation-thus requiring it to try to acquire more substantive expertise in a
number of subject matters.64 The amount of nontax regulation in which the
IRS must engage may well have been on the Chief's mind when refusing to
assume that Congress intended to delegate the premium tax credit question to
the IRS. Perhaps the Chief was signaling in King that Congress should stop
delegating nontax issues to the IRS.
The evidence of tax exceptionalism, however, extends beyond a few
sentences about the IRS's lack of expertise in "crafting health insurance policy
of this sort."65 Perhaps one of the starkest oddities in the Chief's opinion is
his repeated use of the term "IRS Rule" to describe the agency regulation
under review. The Chief uses this term eight times in his opinion." For tax
lawyers and scholars, it is quite anomalous to refer to federal tax regulations
as IRS Rules when the well-established terminology is Treasury regulations.67
Under the Affordable Care Act Congress expressly delegated the regulatory
authority at issue to the Secretary of the Treasury;6 8 the regulations, moreover,
formally originated from the Treasury, in coordination with the IRS."
62. Andy Grewal, The IRS Isn't an Expert?, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 29,
2015), http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/the-irs-isn-t-an-expert-by-andy-grewal.
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-1(k) (2015) (defining "exchange" to have "the same meaning as in 45
CFR 155.20"). See generally Lederman & Dugan, supra note 8.
64. Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L. J. 1717, 1747, 1760-
61(2014).
65. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
66. See id. at 2487,2488,2494.
67. As the IRS itself explains, "Treasury regulations (26 C.F.R.)-commonly referred to as
Federal tax regulations-pick up where the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) leaves off by providing the
official interpretation of the IRC by the U.S. Department of the Treasury." Tax Code, Regulations
and Official Guidance, IRS (last updated Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/Tax-Professionals/Tax-
Code,-Regulations-and-Official-Guidance-26cfr.
68. I.R.C. § 36B(g) (2012) (providing that "[t]he Secretary [of the Treasury] shall prescribe such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section").
69. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377-01,30,377 (May 23,2012) (noting
that "[a]fter consideration of all the comments, the proposed regulations are adopted as amended by
this Treasury decision").
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In case there was any doubt about the Chief's exceptional use of "IRS
Rule" in King, the Court appears to have never before referred to agency
interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code as IRS Rules. To date, the Court
has used the term "Treasury Regulation" in 374 cases, but the term "IRS Rule"
appears just once, in King v. Burwell.70 The term "IRS Rule" seems to be
traced to the Petitioners' briefing in this case.7 ' The Chief seems to have then
decided to adopt their use of the term throughout his opinion for the Court.
The Chief's use of IRS Rule may be strong evidence that he is not, in fact,
a tax lawyer, as no tax lawyer would call a Treasury regulation an IRS Rule.
If so, the question posed by the title of this Essay may have an easy, not-so-
interesting answer. But his use of the term may also reflect his tax
exceptionalist orientation, in that he views IRS statutory interpretations as
different from-and owed less deference than-interpretations advanced by
other agencies.7 2 Indeed, reference to the IRS (instead of Treasury) is
reminiscent of the controversy surrounding some politicians' use of IRS Code
(instead of Internal Revenue Code) as "a political device designed to steer
public frustration over taxes towards the IRS and away from Congressional
lawmakers."" Similarly, here, perhaps the Chief's invocation of IRS Rule
signals that regulations promulgated by the IRS do not stand on the same
footing as regulations promulgated by any number of other agencies. In other
words, whereas traditional agency regulations are owed judicial deference,
"IRS Rules" are less deserving of such deference. For the Chief- as for many
tax lawyers, judges, and scholars -tax exceptionalism may well still be alive
and kicking.
70. This search of the Supreme Court Cases Database on Westlaw was conducted on September
4, 2015. Three additional cases included "IRS rule," but not to refer to a Treasury Regulation. See
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602 n.27 (1983) (quoting congressional statement
referring to IRS Revenue Ruling as "IRS rules"); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.737,742 (1984) (referring
to an IRS Revenue Procedure as "IRS rules"), abrogated by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014); United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 548 (1990)
(referring to IRS Revenue Rulings as "IRS rules").
71. See, e.g., Merits Brief for Petitioners at 6, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-
114) (stating "[t]hese regulations ('the IRS Rule') contradict the statutory text restricting subsidies to
Exchanges 'established by the State under section 1311"' and then using "IRS Rule" another 36 times
throughout the brief).
72. As Ellen Aprill explores in her contribution to this Symposium, the Tax Court in the past
similarly had refused to apply Chevron deference to IRS statutory interpretations and may well use
King as an excuse to resume that practice. Aprill, supra note 8, at 17 ("Predicting from past case law
in this case is much like reading tea leaves; nonetheless, the reluctance of the Tax Court to adopt
Chevron and its willingness to cite Brown & Williamson as a canon of statutory possibility underscores
the possibility that the Tax Court will make use of King v. Burwell to review and reject tax regulations
under a Chevron Step 0.").
73. Andy Grewal, The IRS Code, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Apr. 14, 2015),
http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/the-irs-code-by-andy-grewal.
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If tax exceptionalism is indeed driving the Chief's refusal to accord
Chevron deference to the Treasury regulation at issue in King, this new major
questions doctrine may well be good for tax only. We do not know yet if the
Court (or the lower courts) will extend this sweeping change in administrative
law to other regulatory contexts. But we should find out soon enough. The
Chief's major questions doctrine is already front and center in a number of
legal challenges to agency regulations, including challenges to the agency's
interpretation of the contraceptive mandate in the Affordable Care Act and to
the Federal Communication Commission's net neutrality regulation. 4 As one
of us has previously noted, legal challenges to the EPA's Clean Power Plan
seem like another prime candidate to test the Chief's new doctrine."
It is probably safe to assume that we will soon discover whether the Chief
in King v. Burwell intended to cause a sea change in administrative law or was
thinking like a tax lawyer and crafting a major questions doctrine that is good
for tax only.
CONCLUSION
So, based on his opinion in King v. Burwell, is it fair to wonder whether
the Chief Justice is a tax lawyer at heart? As for administrative law, there is
some evidence that the Chief is thinking like a tax exceptionalist. Time will
tell whether he intended his new major questions doctrine to apply beyond
tax. His approach to statutory interpretation, however, even more strikingly
reflects how tax law interprets transactions by not letting form (text) trump
substance (purpose). Although we doubt the Chief or the Court more
generally is actually thinking about tax law's substance-over-form doctrine
when engaging in this brand of contextualism, maybe they should be. As this
74. See, e.g., Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, Little
Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, S. Ct. No. 15-105, 2015 WL 5029190 (Aug. 24,
2015) (arguing that "the threshold question is whether the Departments had the requisite interpretive
authority and 'expertise' to resolve this 'major question' of profound social, 'economic and political
significance' (quoting King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489); Amicus Curiae Brief of International Center for Law
& Economics and Administrative Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners at 3-4, U.S. Telecom Ass'n
v. FCC, D.C. Cir. No. 15-1063, 2015 WL 4698404 (Aug. 6, 2015) (arguing that "the [net neutrality]
Order should be rejected as exceeding the Commission's statutory authority and as presenting and
addressing major questions-questions of 'deep economic and political significance,' see, e.g., King
v. Burwell. . . -that can only be addressed by Congress").
75. See Walker, supra note 39.
76. In her contribution, Kristin Hickman explores a third option-that the majority joined the
Chief's opinion to save the regulation yet did not really embrace the Chief's novel major questions
doctrines-but Professor Hickman nevertheless argues that there may well be unintended
consequences from their joinder. Hickman, supra note 8, at 65-66. As discussed in note 43 supra,
Justice Kennedy articulated a similar major questions doctrine at oral arguments, but Professor
Hickman is right that we do not know the position of the other joiners (or if Justice Kennedy fully
embraces the new doctrine).
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Essay illustrates, there may well be great benefits in looking to tax law (and
vice versa) to better understand and further develop other areas of the law such
as statutory interpretation and administrative law.7
77. For this reason, Andy Grewal's observation on the lack of participation of tax scholars in the
King v. Burwell litigation is all the more noteworthy. Grewal, supra note 8, at 48. As Professor
Grewal notes in his contribution to the Symposium, "Tax professors routinely provide thoughtful
analysis of non-core tax provisions, like those relating to the Earned Income Tax Credit. Also,
discussions of tax expenditures have enjoyed somewhat of a resurgence in recent years. Interpretive
and policy issues related to non-core provisions fit comfortably within the tax professoriate's
bailiwick." Id. at 45-46.
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